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The frAMing of CliMAte ChAnge. Climate change is discussed and represented—or “framed”—in many different ways, which 
inf luences both how the issue is perceived and 
what solutions may be proposed. In a 2007 Science 
paper, Nisbet and Mooney discuss the framing of 
controversies such as stem cell research, evolution of 
species, and global climate change. They summarize 
the literature to define framing as a way of organiz-
ing ideas and defining a phenomenon in order to 
resonate with people’s core values and assumptions. 
Importantly, they note that framing allows people to 
identify quickly what matters, who might be respon-
sible, and what should be done.
Among the many framings of climate change 
(see Moser and Dilling 2007), one rather common 
framing is as prospective environmental catastro-
phe, which lately includes terms such as “tipping 
points” or “tipping elements.” Russill, in a 2008 En-
vironmental Communication paper, found that this 
framing arises from (and, we would argue, is given 
power and legitimacy from its association with) the 
geosciences, but that such messages of catastrophe 
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are propagated and amplified by political, media, 
and societal circuits. Yet catastrophic framings of 
climate change largely ignore contributions from 
other types of knowledge to understanding climate 
change and its significance. For example, fram-
ing climate change as a result of market failure 
(as economists such as the United Kingdom’s Sir 
Nicholas Stern have done) leads to a narrative of 
managerial correction by “releasing the power” of 
the carbon markets. A very different framing of 
climate change might come from an ethics per-
spective, in which a narrative of responsibility for 
historical emissions demands reparations for dam-
age caused, now and in the future. Environmental 
historians might frame climate change in terms 
of past civilizations experiencing environmental 
change, suggesting a narrative of longer-term 
continuity and social capacity to adapt to change. 
Hulme provides a deeper analysis of these frames, 
and others, in his 2009 book.
Psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists 
are arguing that catastrophic framings of climate 
change may be blocking more sustainable political 
pathways, more publicly motivating media report-
age, and a deeper societal engagement with climate 
change. A 2009 study by O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole 
examined the effect of fear-inducing imagery and 
icons on climate change engagement. They demon-
strate how these sorts of catastrophic framings are 
likely to disempower individuals, distancing them 
from the issue and leading to feelings of fatalism, 
denial, or apathy.
Turnpenny and colleagues elucidate in their 2009 
paper how climate change is a “wicked” phenomenon: 
there are complex interdependencies, difficulties in 
defining the problems themselves, and difficulty in 
identifying and reaching consensus on solutions. These 
characteristics pose severe challenges for effective 
policy and individual action. Seemingly elegant single 
solutions offered through a catastrophic frame (such 
as calls for a globally binding mitigation agreement 
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erarchy, we examined the 
proceedings from the Co-
penhagen Climate Change 
Congress, held in March 
2009. The Congress Web 
site (http://climatecongress.
ku.dk) states that the event 
was attended by more than 
2,500 delegates from nearly 
80 countries. The Congress 
produced six key messages 
(see sidebar) and claimed it 
was updating the findings of 
the IPCC Fourth Assessment 
Report in the lead-up to the 
international climate negoti-
ations at the United Nations 
Climate Change Conference 
(COP15) in December. Here 
we present four key findings 
that emerge from analysis of 
the 590 abstracts detailing 
the oral presentations given 
at the Congress.
disCiplinArY representAtion. Three of 
the authors of this paper, all interdisciplinary climate 
researchers, independently classified each Congress 
oral presentation into a knowledge domain derived 
from the Journal Citation Reports (JCR) of ISI’s 
Web of Knowledge subject categorization, following 
Bjurström and Polk’s methodology. A “knowledge 
domain” refers to a body of knowledge that is used in 
one or more related scientific disciplines. For example, 
in the JCR, “geochemistry and geophysics,” “physi-
cal geography,” and “geology” are three of the eight 
subjects grouped into the “geoscience” knowledge 
domain. Because economics typically dominates 
the climate-related social sciences, we differentiated 
economics from other social sciences. Note that we 
used the abstracts to classify each oral presentation 
into a domain, not the presumed background of each 
presenter. 
The Copenhagen Congress was exceptional in 
its disciplinary spread of papers (compared, for 
example, to the knowledge domains represented in 
the IPCC). We found contributions from diverse 
knowledge domains—from ethics and philosophy 
to the geosciences (Fig. 1). Indeed, the majority of 
papers were not from the geosciences. Yet the Con-
gress secretariat chose to emphasize geosciences in 
to prevent imminent environmental catastrophe) are 
proving elusive. Rather than advocating the selection 
of a particular frame, we instead suggest that multiple 
frames should be allowed to gain legitimacy, opening 
the way to multiple solutions even though with their in-
herent complexity they may initially be unappealing.
An episteMologiCAl hierArChY. There 
is emerging recognition that different institutions 
promote certain types of climate change knowledge 
production, while other types are marginalized—a 
situation we term an “epistemological hierarchy.” In 
a forthcoming article in Climatic Change, Bjurström 
and Polk have found evidence in the IPCC Third 
Assessment Report of disciplinary climate change 
knowledge biases toward the physical and economic 
sciences; and a 2007 Environmental Science & Policy 
paper by Karlson and colleagues documents a geo-
graphical North/South knowledge divide. As these 
authors note, promoting certain types of climate 
change knowledge over others has important con-
sequences. By marginalizing certain framings of 
climate change—framings which may help to address 
the “wickedness” of climate change—fruitful political 
and social responses may be excluded.
To seek evidence of such an epistemological hi-
Fig. 1. percentage of oral presentations given in each of the nine domains. Crosses 
indicate the number of presentations coded by each analyst for each domain. this 
figure demonstrates substantial intercoder agreement. some disagreement is 
noted in classifying oral presentations into the multidisciplinary environmental 
science, energy and resources, and social science domains. however, rather than 
detracting from the results, such disagreement strengthens our conclusions that 
much current climate change research is being carried out in interdisciplinary 
(hence difficult to classify) fields, rather than in the geosciences or in economics 
alone—disciplines which are most typically used to frame climate change.
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their media strategy and conference management, 
with key pre-Congress media interviews presenting 
geoscience research through a catastrophic framing. 
Much of the subsequent media reportage focused on 
potential future catastrophic environmental break-
down. The journal Science headlined their coverage 
Key Messages arising froM the ConferenCe
Key Message 1: Climatic trends
Recent observations show that greenhouse gas emissions and many aspects of the climate are changing near the up-
per boundary of the IPCC range of projections. Many key climate indicators are already moving beyond the patterns of 
natural variability within which contemporary society and economy have developed and thrived. These indicators include 
global mean surface temperature, sea level rise, global ocean temperature, Arctic sea ice extent, ocean acidification, and 
extreme climatic events. With unabated emissions, many trends in climate will likely accelerate, leading to an increasing 
risk of abrupt or irreversible climatic shifts.
Key Message 2: social and environmental disruption
The research community provides much information to support discussions on “dangerous climate change.” Recent 
observations show that societies and ecosystems are highly vulnerable to even modest levels of climate change, with poor 
nations and communities, ecosystem services, and biodiversity particularly at risk. Temperature increases above 2°C will 
be difficult for contemporary societies to cope with and are likely to cause major societal and environmental disruptions 
through the rest of the century and beyond.
Key Message 3: long-term strategy: global targets and timetables 
Rapid, sustained, and effective mitigation based on coordinated global and regional action is required to avoid “dangerous 
climate change” regardless of how it is defined. Weaker targets for 2020 increase the risk of serious impacts, includ-
ing the crossing of tipping points, and make the task of meeting 2050 targets more difficult and costly. Setting a credible 
long-term price for carbon and the adoption of policies that promote energy efficiency and low-carbon technologies are 
central to effective mitigation.
Key Message 4: equity dimensions 
Climate change is having, and will have, strongly differential effects on people within and between countries and regions, 
on this generation and future generations, and on human societies and the natural world. An effective, well-funded adap-
tation safety net is required for those people least capable of coping with climate change impacts, and equitable mitigation 
strategies are needed to protect the poor and most vulnerable. Tackling climate change should be seen as integral to the 
broader goals of enhancing socioeconomic development and equity throughout the world.
Key Message 5: inaction is inexcusable
Society already has many tools and approaches—economic, technological, behavioral, and managerial—to deal effectively 
with the climate change challenge. If these tools are not vigorously and widely implemented, adaptation to unavoidable 
climate change and the societal transformation required to decarbonize economies will not be achieved. A wide range 
of benefits will flow from a concerted effort to achieve effective and rapid adaptation and mitigation. These include job 
growth in the sustainable energy sector; reductions in the health, social, economic, and environmental costs of climate 
change; and the repair of ecosystems and revitalization of ecosystem services.
Key Message 6: Meeting the Challenge
If the societal transformation required to meet the climate change challenge is to be achieved, then a number of signifi-
cant constraints must be overcome and critical opportunities seized. These include reducing inertia in social and econom-
ic systems; building on a growing public desire for governments to act on climate change; reducing activities that increase 
greenhouse gas emissions and reduce resilience (e.g., subsidies); and enabling the shifts from ineffective governance and 
weak institutions to innovative leadership in government, the private sector, and civil society. Linking climate change with 
broader sustainable consumption and production concerns, human rights issues, and democratic values is crucial for shift-
ing societies toward more sustainable development pathways.
with “Projections of Climate Change Go from Bad to 
Worse,” while the BBC reported “‘More Bad News’ on 
Climate Change.” Catastrophic reporting reinforces 
the hierarchical preeminence of the geosciences and, 
conversely, the knowledge claims of the geosciences 
provide legitimacy and credibility to catastrophic 
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constraints on the geography, and representation, of 
knowledge.
Annex 1 countries (those that have responsibilities 
under the Kyoto Protocol for mitigating their green-
house gas emissions) are considerably overrepresent-
ed, while non–Annex 1 representatives presented just 
12% of all contributions. The dominant geographical 
origins of presented knowledge are the United States 
and the United Kingdom, with over half of all contri-
butions from U.S., U.K., Dutch, or German partici-
pants. Participants from the Middle East, Africa, and 
South America together presented a little more than 
5% of all papers. Meaningful dialogue with countries 
such as China and India is critically important in the 
debate around emissions reductions, international 
development, and social justice, yet participation 
from each of these countries was just 2%.
It is clear that the majority of climate knowledge 
presented at this international research conference 
is produced in just a few regions of the world. Yet 
the impacts of climate change reach worldwide, and 
effective climate mitigation requires collective emis-
sions reductions. Authors such as Karlson et al. (2007) 
and Kadlikar and Sagar (1999) warn that scientific 
knowledge divisions across geographical boundaries 
place limits both on effective policymaking and on 
equitable negotiation of international agreements. 
Contributions from Ford, and Dugmore and col-
leagues in the 2009 edited collection, Adapting to 
Climate Change: Thresholds, Values, Governance, 
examine Inuit response to sea ice change and limits 
to Norse Greenland settlements, respectively. Both 
demonstrate the need to bring geographically and 
culturally nuanced knowledge about climate change 
into national and international discourse: if the 
majority of knowledge claims originate from a small 
proportion of nations, then that knowledge will be 
necessarily limited in its geographical scope and 
political legitimacy.
gender representAtion. Our third find-
ing concerns the gender of the presenters. The gender 
of the first author from each oral presentation was 
recorded. In cases where we did not know the par-
ticipant, the author was located online. Less than a 
third of oral presentations were from women. This 
was especially pronounced in the geosciences, where 
less than 20% of presentations were from women, 
contrasting with more than 40% within the social 
sciences. Sources such as Gender Climate Change 
(www.gendercc.net) and Terry’s (2009) edited collec-
framing. This serves to reinforce the message of cli-
mate change as an unfolding, almost predetermined, 
disaster. Hulme’s 2009 book contends that one of 
the reasons there is inaction and disagreement on 
climate change is because science is not doing the 
job we want or expect it to do. For example, the 
geosciences can help narrow down the range of the 
climate sensitivity, but they can only partly address 
the social, cultural, and political questions of what 
constitutes dangerous climate change. On the other 
hand, other knowledge domains well-represented in 
the Congress presentations (but less so in the media 
reporting and key messages), such as the social sci-
ences or ethics and philosophy, are well-equipped for 
this sort of enquiry.
geogrAphiCAl representAtion. Our 
second finding concerns the geography of knowledge. 
The conference proceedings listed each participant’s 
institutional affiliation and geographical location. We 
used this as a first approximation for participants’ 
nationality. While it is clear this will not represent 
the participant’s nationality in all cases, we hypoth-
esized that researchers who move are likely to be 
significantly influenced in their intellectual work by 
the cultural context of their employment.
While participants from 56 countries gave pre-
sentations, the geographical distribution of these 
contributions was very uneven, with most of the 
papers originating from very few countries (Fig. 2). 
The imposition of the English language on the Con-
gress presentations and reporting introduces further 
Fig. 2. geographical distribution of participants as a 
percentage of total oral presentations.
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tion on gender and climate emphasize the importance 
of gender equality in working toward more effective 
adaptation and mitigation strategies.
Terry (2009a) contends that to some extent, the 
lack of attention to gender issues in climate change 
reflects a more general misunderstanding of the social 
sciences within mainstream climate framing. She 
describes the mainstream framing as stereotypically 
“masculine” in its discourse of technological innova-
tion, large-scale economic instruments, and climate 
modeling. She finds such discourses inherently 
gender-inequitable: for example, womens’ restricted 
access to resources such as land, credit, and informa-
tion hinders them from playing an equitable role in 
climate-mitigation market instruments.
KnoWledge hierArChY. Finally, the domi-
nance of geoscience presentations on the first day of 
the Congress may provide further evidence of an 
implicit hierarchy in the knowledge domains contrib-
uting to the framing of climate change. This hierarchy 
is similar to that reflected in the three working groups 
(WG) contributing to the IPCC Assessment Reports: 
WG I focuses on physical science, WG II on the vul-
nerability of socioeconomic and natural systems, and 
WG III on mitigation options. This structural linear-
ity of knowledge implies that better climate change 
science leads to better knowledge of potential impacts, 
which are prerequisites for, and will necessarily lead 
to, actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
to adapt political, social, and economic systems.  Yet, 
as risk researchers such as Gregory and colleagues 
note, such linearity in moving from intellectual 
understanding to social change is not necessarily 
reflected in real-world practice. A good example of 
this nonlinearity between knowledge and behavior is 
the large carbon footprint of most climate scientists, 
despite their knowledge of climate change causes 
and effects! A myriad of psychological, social, and 
infrastructural barriers remain impediments to more 
sustainable practices in the conduct of research—even 
climate change research.
ConClusion. This article offers evidence that 
an epistemological hierarchy exists in the fram-
ing of climate change whereby the geosciences 
disproportionately influence the representation of 
climate change as primarily an environmental issue. 
Developed country, and male, contributions also 
disproportionately influence this framing. We argue 
that simply carrying out more physical science—
and framing climate change as an awaited future 
catastrophe—will not enable political leaders to win 
the case for large-scale, transformative social change. 
Climate change is a deeply contextualized and cultur-
ally situated phenomenon. Efforts to address gender 
and geographical equality, as well as forging closer 
links between the geosciences, the social sciences, and 
the humanities will greatly enhance links between 
knowledge and action and further help to address 
climate change.
While the IPCC Third Assessment Report at-
tempted to include more social science research, 
Bjurström and Polk ’s analysis found that such 
representation remained minimal. Erlich and Ken-
nedy raised the idea of a “Millennium Assessment of 
Human Behaviour” in 2005. Their vision was for an 
ongoing series of transparent and open forums, mod-
eled on the IPCC but mainly focused on the social 
sciences—for a “deeper consideration of the ethical 
dimensions of how we treat each other and our life-
support systems.” The need for such an institution 
was ref lected in several of the Copenhagen social 
science sessions, and is supported by us here, in a 
call to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report to explicitly 
recognize the contribution that social science and 
humanities can make. Perhaps this could take form 
through the establishment of a fourth IPCC Working 
Group, “Historical, Cultural, and Social Contexts,” 
taking its place as the new WG I in order to provide 
legitimacy to a plurality of different framings of the 
issue before the physical science of climate change is 
assessed. Until we recognize that climate change must 
be understood as an ethical, cultural, and political 
phenomenon—even more than it is an environmen-
tal one—the chances for meaningfully addressing 
climate change remain low.
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